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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1953 TERM'.
Computation of Award: Actual Earnings
Whether earnings which claimant would have received but
for a shutdown of his factory occasioned by a strike in another
plant should be considered together with earnings actually re-
ceived in determining claimant's wage-earning capacity was de-
cided in the negative in Croce v. Ford Motor Co. 5
The statute provides that in cases of temporary partial dis-
ability "... the compensation shall be two-thirds of the difference
between the employee's average weekly wages before the accident
and his wage-earning capacity after the accident . . . "8 and fur-
ther, that the wage-earning capacity "shall be determined by his
actual earnings."3 7
It was held that the employee's capacity to earn more or less
during the disability period was immaterial, the sole criterion
being wages actually received by him. The court relied on
Matise v. Munro Waterproofing Co.,"" wherein an award based on
"medical evidence" that claimant's earning capacity had been
reduced fifty per cent was set aside on the ground that where
actual earnings are present, 9 consideration of other factors is
improper.
But whether the Matise and Croce cases firmly hold that ac-
tual earnings are the sole measure of the rate of compensation
under all circumstances may be questioned. In Mikno v. Endicott
Johnson Corp.,4 where earnings were reduced when a factory
closed because of general business conditions, it was said:
We do not regard . . . Matise v. Munro Waterproofing
Co. . . . as mandating that actual earnings are the exclusive
basis for determining earning capacity under all circumstances
and regardless of the cause of reduced earnings.41
Also, in Block v. Ready-Froelich, Inc., the court was of the
opinion that in case of a general business decline, the disabled
worker should not be saved by compensation from bearing the
burden shared by his fellow-workers. And other cases have indi-
35. 307 N. Y. 125, 120 N. E. 2d 527 (1954).
36. Wo xmN's COMPENSATioN LAW § 15 (5).
37. Id. § 15 (5-a).
38. 293 N. Y. 496, 58 N. E. 2d 511 (1944).
39. In the absence of any actual earnings the Board can hear other evidence and
fix a "reasonable" compensation rate. WoRKMEN's COmPENSAON LAW § 15 (5-a);
Sammis v. Queens Borough G. & E. Co., 257 App.. Div. 58, 12 N. Y. S. 2d 286 (3d Dep't1939).40. 278 App. Div. 598, 102 N. Y. S. 2d 45 (3d Dep't 1951)
41. Id. at 599. 102 N. Y. S. 2d at 45.
42. 240 App. Div. 9, 269 N. Y. Supp. 284 (3d Dep't 1934), appeal dismissed, 264
N. Y. 618, 191 N. E. 595 (1934).
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cated that where there is evidence of a claimant's bad faith, e. g.,
where it appears that claimant rejected jobs at higher pay which
he was physically able to perform, "actual earnings" would not
be the sole measure of the rate of compensation.
Contribution By Prior Employers
Successive decisions have engrafted to the Workmen's Com-
pensation Law a proviso that where prior compensable injuries
have contributed measurably to ultimate disability, the award
should be apportioned among the prior employers in proportion
to the extent to which the earlier accidents contributed to the
final condition.44 This rule was reaffirmed by the Court of Appeals
this term in two cases joined on appeal,4" despite serious prob-
lems of statutory construction.
Claimants Meszaros and Braunstein had suffered prior com-
pensable injuries, and ultimate disability following their latest
injuries was found to have been caused in part by the earlier
accidents. The problem appeared in the fact that their earnings
after the latest accidents were greater than they had been af the
time of the earlier contributing accidents. The court held that
the award should be charged in part against the earlier employ-
ers, despite the fact that their liability might exceed the wages
paid to claimants while they were in the earlier employ.
The New York statute provides:
In no event shall compensation when combined with de-
creased earnings or earning capacity exceed the amount of
wages which the employee was receiving at the time the injury
occurred. 46
The majority observed that the statute referred only to earn-
ings at the time of the latest injury, for which compensation is
now being awarded. Any other result, it was argued, would permit
43. See, e. g., Santo v. Symington Mach. Co., 237 App. Div. 242, 261 ,N. Y. Supp.
706 (3d Dep't 1932).
44. Anderson v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 256 N. Y. 146, 175 N. E. 654 (1931);
Chiodo v. Newhall Co., 254 N. Y. 534, 173 N. E.-854 (1930) ; Zuk v. McGuire Bros., 277
App. Div. 956, 99 N. Y. S. 2d 617 (3d Dep't 1950) ; Thomas v. Royal Dairy, 270 App.
Div. 688, 63 N. Y. S. 2d 276 (3d Dep't 1946).
45. Meszaros v. Goldman, Braunstein v. General Marine Repair, 307 N. Y. 296, 121
N. E. 2d 232 (1954). In the Braunstein case the Appellate Division had affirmed an
award against the latest employer only, on the ground that WORKxmEN's COMPENSATION
LAW § 15 (6) demanded it. 281 App. Div. 1059, 121 N. Y. S. 2d 386 (3d Dep't 1953).
In Meszaros, an award partly against the prior employer was upheld on the theory that
the statute applied only to earnings greater than those obtaining at the time of the latest
accident. 281 App. Div. 1063, 121 N. Y. S. 2d 421 (3d Dep't 1953).
46. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 15 (6).
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